科技部補助專題研究計畫報告

狄德羅的《達朗柏的夢》:唯物主義、生物學、性別

報告類別:成果報告計畫類別:個別型計畫

計 畫 編 號 : MOST 109-2629-H-110-002-執 行 期 間 : 109年08月01日至110年07月31日 執 行 單 位 : 國立中山大學外國語文學系 (所)

計畫主持人: 田偉文

計畫參與人員: 博士班研究生-兼任助理:劉舒雅

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中華民國110年09月22日

中 文 摘 要 : 狄德羅(1713-1784,法國文學家與哲學家)的許多著作被天主教會 和法國政府列為禁書,這些書在他死後才被秘密出版,因為狄德羅 是激進的唯物主義者。狄德羅的思想體系把上帝排除在外,用物質 取代上帝,他認為大自然的結構並非始於上帝的創造而且世上沒有 能離開肉體的心靈或精神,他主張唯心和唯物的二元性必須被物質 的存在取代,因此物質必須被創造和自我創造。在此唯物主義思想 下,狄德羅以對話的形式(此乃他用文學方式來探索哲學思想時最 喜愛的文類)創作出才華橫溢的作品,《達朗柏的夢》即是一例。 《達朗柏的夢》其實是相連接的三個對話性文本——《狄德羅和《 達蘭柏的對話》、《達朗柏的夢》、《對話的接續》,這些深具獨 創性的對話作品為讀者提供一趟關於物理學、生物學、和自我創造 之宇宙的雄偉旅程。這些作品亦是針對性與性別的沉思,因為對話 中有一位和達朗柏一樣真實存在的女主角,那就是茱麗・萊斯皮納 斯,她是達朗柏的密友。達朗柏在和狄德羅討論唯物主義後〔第一 個對話文本)就睡著了,他做夢並說夢話,在一旁的茱麗隨即寫下 達朗柏的夢話(第二個對話文本),接著茱麗就和照顧達朗柏的醫 生波爾多討論這些夢話(第三個對話文本)。達朗柏的夢話主要是 有關生物學和性的思考,特別是接代、生殖、和男女生殖器的痕跡 認同,其夢話視男性和女性的特徵為光譜性而非二元性。然而這些 對話亦強調,性不僅僅是生物學的概念(且比一般認知 的更加複雜),它同時亦涵蓋了性別的社會現象以及陽剛與陰柔的 涵化表達。狄德羅將茱麗塑造為一位完全將性和生物學理解為唯物 主義現象的女性角色,同時也使她對這種認知表現出「女性化」的 震驚與憤怒。茱麗對其性別的表現使狄德羅得以去表述性別角色的 文化僵固性與人為性是有違性別差異的流動自然性的。

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dialogues he wrote, his favorite genre of the exploration of ideas in a literary satisfying manner. D' Alembert's Dream (composed in 1769) is such a dialogue—or actually, three connected dialogues: A Conversation between Diderot and d'Alembert, D' Alembert's Dream, and Sequel to the Conversation. These dialogues are a breathtaking tour of speculative ingenuity touching upon physics, biology, and

the self-creating universe. They are also contemplations on sex and gender, and this mainly because of the important presence in the dialogues of

Julie de L' Espinasse, the intimate friend of Jean le Rond d' Alembert, and like him, an actual person in Diderot's circle. After d' Alembert's conversation with Diderot on materialism (the first dialogue), d' Alembert falls into a feverish dream, with Julie by his side who notes down his ravings inspired by what he discussed with Diderot (the second dialogue); Julie then discusses these ravings with Doctor Bordeu who is called in to tend to the ill d' Alembert (the third dialogue). Much of d' Alembert's ravings concern biology and sexuality, especially notions of

generation, procreation, and the vestigial identity of male and female genitalia, with male and female characteristics seen as existing on a spectrum rather than as a binary. But as the dialogues also make clear, whereas sex is a matter of biology (and a much more complex one than often thought), there is also the social phenomenon of gender, acculturated expressions of masculinity and femininity. Diderot makes Julie someone who comes to entirely understand sexuality and biology as materialist phenomena but also as someone who displays "feminine" shock and outrage at what she understands. In this way, Julie performs her gender in a way that allows Diderot to suggest the culturally fixed artificiality of gender roles in opposition to the fluid

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英文關鍵詞:

Denis Diderot, Dialogue, Materialism, Biology, Sexuality, Gender

報告內容:

前言

This project brings a historical perspective to matters of sex, gender, and technology with "technology" understood as a speculative reconsideration of cultural notions of sexuality and gender. This reconsideration is based on eighteenth-century materialism, a philosophy that takes into radical account contemporary developments in medicine and physics. Although Diderot's view of gender cannot be directly connected with forms of technology in the modern sense of the word, it still is a conceptual beginning of such a connection because Diderot, through his materialist outlook, divorces gender from notions of naturalness and thus helps prepare the possibility to view technology as one potentially constituent factor in the establishment of gender. The expected impact is mainly academic: it will add to our understanding of how gender is a cultural product and how even sex (maleness and femaleness) are developmental rather than absolute categories.

研究目的

This project intends to investigate the following issues: (1) Early historical beginnings of regarding gender as a cultural (and changeable) rather than a natural (and fixed) phenomenon. That gender is a cultural ascription means that, artificial though it may be, it is a culturally desired distinction, specifying attitudes and behaviors that a culture assigns to men and women according to distinctions that are presented as natural rather than cultural. In this project, the historical beginnings of this questioning of gender as a natural phenomenon are those of the eighteenthcentury Enlightenment, especially in France, and especially as expressed by one of the most fearless and innovative thinkers of the Enlightenment, Denis Diderot. Like for many eighteenth-century philosophers, for Diderot too philosophy is "natural philosophy," in other words, a philosophy imbued and cognizant of contemporary developments in medicine, physics, biology, and other branches of science. Diderot, editor and contributor to his huge project of the Encyclopédie, was among the best informed men of his day and by this as well as by temperament uniquely qualified to develop the radical idea of "gender" as opposed to "sex." (2) The particular radical shape of Diderot's "natural philosophy." Diderot was an extreme materialist, that is to say that he was convinced that the world and all that is, will, and has been in it is the result of natural processes of constant change and chance, a world without teleology, transcendendence, or creation ex nihilo. His ideas prefigure Darwin's, with single cell organisms (after a mysterious moment of spontaneous generation) slowly finding ways of dividing and multiplying. Generation through sexuality in this idea is a development introduced only as organisms became complex, and the imprint of the original sameness of the different sexes is still traceable in the mirrored physiology of reproductive organs. Even though Diderot does not use different names to distinguish "sex" and "gender" as, respectively, naturally developed and culturally sanctioned differences, he clearly introduces this distinction conceptually in D'Alembert's Dream. For this reason he deserves acknowledgment in the current debate on gender, science, and technology. (3) The literary and philosophical genre of dialogue. With dialogues such as D'Alembert's Dream, Diderot reinvigorated the ancient genre of the philosophical dialogue. In his hands, the genre that Plato had introduced in Western culture became vibrant and exciting again. Dialogues continued to be written after Plato but, especially in the religious controversies of the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries, became dogmatic statements rather than true investigations of particular and controversial issues. Diderot gave the dialogue all of that power of stirring up thought and controversy again, and made the genre approach the new genre of the eighteenth century, the novel.

文獻探討與研究方法

This one-year project is meant to yield an interpretation of D'Alembert's Dream and the way it prefigures the opposition between sex and gender, informed as the work is by contemporary scientific knowledge. My research principle will be to investigate and charaterize scientific and philosophical positions expressed by the characters Diderot, d'Alembert, and Julie de l'Espinasse. In addition, I will look at the work as a literary work, with special attention to Diderot's decision to give a large role to a female interlocutor. It is this decision that renews the genre of dialogue-traditionally a very male genre--and brings it in contact with the genre of the novel--the genre that introduces literature to female perspectives. (2) Anticipated problems and means of resolution Diderot's dialogue is intellectually challenging, dealing as it does with cutting edge scientific and philosophical ideas of his time, ideas presented with great literary subtlety. I still believe that I am well-equipped to deal with these problems. I know Diderot's dialogues quite well, having taught them several times in my PhD-level seminar "Philosophical Dialogue." The genre of the philosophical dialogue also features in my 1993 dissertation Missed Transcendence: Forms of Truth and Failure in Shaftesbury's "Characteristics." The French eighteenth century has been an early focus of my research, in the time that I taught at the University of Utrecht in The Netherlands. In 1992 I published (in Dutch, and in the Dutch journal Forum der Letteren) the article "Intellectuele intimiteit: de achttiende-eeuwse salon and zeventiende-eeuw feminism" ("Intellectual Intimacy: the Eighteenth-Century Salon and Seventeeht-Century Feminism"). The article dealt with early feminist ideas as enabling that French female-led form of sociability of the "salon." I also published an 1994 article on the eighteenth-century English historian Edward Gibbon; it dealt with Gibbon's lengthy stay as a young man in francophone Lausanne ("Coming Home: Edward Gibbon's Essai sur l'étude de la littérature and the 'Quality of Foreigness,'" Orbis Litterarum 49 [1994], pp. 84-98). Although these publication are of too long ago to submit with this project application, they may still indicate an existing interest and expertise on my part.

結果與討論

A journal article on Diderot's D'Alembert's Dream and the notions of sex and gender was written. I also participated in the interdisciplinary conference "Literature and Philosophy. Research Methods. Figures of Form and Thought. An International Scholarly Conference" held by Warsaw University's Research Centre for Contextual Studies and Literary Tradition Studies of Polish Studies and the Philosophy department of Charles University in Prague and presented my paper "Emerging from Dialogue: Julie de l'Espinasse in Diderot's D'Alembert's Dream" during this conference. My project has added to scholarly knowledge of historical developments in the notions of sex and gender as produced by a crucial Enlightenment thinker.

Emerging from Dialogue:

Julie de l'Espinasse in Diderot's D'Alembert's Dream

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1.

The seventeenth and eighteenth centuries—in French literary history referred to as the "classical ages"—worried about how difficult the genre of the philosophical dialogue had become to pull off. This despite some very successful dialogues written by the likes of Fontenelle, Diderot, and de Maistre. But in treatises as well as prefaces to dialogues—prefaces always being indicators, if not of false modesty, then of insecurity—hands are wrung about the genre's impossibility. In 1971 Maurice Roelens devoted a conference lecture to the genre, published the next year, entitled "Le dialogue philosophique: genre impossible? L'opinion des siècles classiques." In it he analyzes quite a few of the despairing prefaces and treatises and puts his finger on what the difficulty—the impossibility—is that frustrates modern attempts at a genre that seemed to come so naturally to the ancient Greeks, the Romans, up to the Renaissance Italians. What is it about us, moderns, that prevents us to step into that desirable tradition?

Well, Roelens explains, the genre pulls into two different directions, directions that at an unhappy point in time—now!—have stopped being compatible. It wants to be philosophy, and it needs to be literature too. It needs to engage with ideas, and it needs to be mimetic. It should give us words as well as characters who use these words as expressive of their personalities. The two sides need to add up in some way, but the felt impossibility is that they hardly ever do anymore. [Socrates was a character, ugly and snub-nosed, old but with an eye for male beauty, slovenly in dress but precise in thinking, son of a midwife, could hold his liquor well, playing dumb to pierce stupidity, living in Athens during the Peloponnesian war

and after the loss to Sparta. All this informs and enhances his pursuit of truth, goodness, happiness, and beauty.]

From the would-be modern writer's point of view, the dialogue form is a powerful cultural sign, but one that comes up empty. From a modern reader's point of view, the philosophical dialogue suffers from *lenteur* and *longueur*: too slow to come to the point, too boring to really fascinate. Frenchmen are impatient readers: they want the gist, the universal; not the story, the particular. Conceived of as categories of taste, the dialogue is the genre of *delicatesse* whereas the current intellectual requirement is that of *exactitude*; exactitude requires continuous reasoning, delicatesse a sort of conversational discontinuity. The philosophical dialogue belongs to an aesthetic of managed disorder, and the aesthetic that characterizes eighteenth-century thought best is one of order.

Or maybe not quite. A complicating twist in all this is pointed out by an English philosopher, greatly influential in France as well (Roelens refers to him extensively):

Anthony Ashley Cooper, Third Earl of Shaftesbury. To him, modernity is not an era of order, or of managed disorder but of the absolute disorder that comes with absolute self-indulgence. Authors write of nothing but themselves, all writing has become "memoir-writing," a kind of soliloquizing in public. Soliloquizing should be a private, preparatory discipline, not a preening public one. Contrast that with the "mirror-writing" of the Ancients, the mimetic quality of mind and art that allowed dialogue to flourish. In a feverish passage of his "Soliloquy, or Advice to an Author" Shaftesbury writes:

THUS *Dialogue* is at an end. The Antients cou'd see their own Faces; but we can't. And why this? Why, but because we have less Beauty: for so our Looking-Glass can inform us.—Ugly Instrument! And for this reason to be hated.—Our Commerce and manner of Conversation, which we think the

politest imaginable, is such, it seems, as we our-selves can't endure to see represented to the Life.

2.

Denis Diderot (1713-1784) had read Shaftesbury. In 1745, when he was 32 and transfixed by the notion of virtue, he translated Shaftesbury's "An Inquiry concerning Virtue and Merit," but he was not at all troubled by the vicarious mimetic self-disgust that looms so large in Shaftesbury's moral universe. In 1769, at age 56, Diderot's *Rêve de d'Alembert* displays how a morally loose mimetic pleasure can really make the philosophical dialogue an entirely possible genre by anchoring philosophy, through literary mimesis, in imagined lives.

The imagined lives in *D'Alembert's Dream* are those of three actual people, the mathematician Jean Lerond d'Alembert, the salonnière Julie de l'Espinasse, and Théophile de Bordeu, medical doctor and collaborator on Diderot's *Encyclopédie*. There is also, in the first dialogue, Diderot himself, simply to instigate the dialogues as a whole. Diderot was a man of cheerful carnality, and he infects d'Alembert and Julie de l'Espinasse with this carnality, a gift for which neither of the two real people thanked him. Julie was ambitious for her salon to be an intellectual hub with d'Alembert as main presence and draw, and here in the dialogue Diderot gives these high-minded people bodies, and bodies in sexual intimacy where in real life their relation was apparently platonic. But this defining of mind as body is just one way in which the philosophical argument of the dialogues, one that rests on the denial of a mind-body distinction, is deepened by literary mimesis.

The dialogues form a breathtaking tour of speculative ingenuity touching upon physics, biology, and the self-creating universe. Diderot, a radical materialist, removes God from his system of thought and replaces him with matter. This means that the explanation of the structure of nature could no longer begin with an act of creation, that no appeal could be

made to transcendence, and that the duality of mind and matter needed to be replaced by the active and dynamic presence of matter only. Matter must therefore be self-created and self-creating. Philosophically dazzling, these dialogues become literarily exciting because of how d'Alembert and Julie de L'Espinasse—depicted as a confirmed skeptic d'Alembert, a woman of an attractive flightiness Julie—come to participate in and deepen the ideas launched by Diderot. And it is Julie who becomes the most exciting materialist in these dialogues. Not only is she the one that makes the largest intellectual leap, but the active understanding she achieves of materialism also suggest the compatibility of Diderot's counterintuitive ideas with common sense.

The title D'Alembert's Dream is actually shorthand for three connected dialogues, A Conversation between Diderot and d'Alembert, D'Alembert's Dream, and Sequel to the Conversation. After d'Alembert's conversation with Diderot on materialism (the first dialogue), d'Alembert falls into a feverish dream, with Julie by his side, uncomprehendingly noting down his ravings (the second dialogue). In this second dialogue Julie turns from a secretary taking dictation into a participant in dialogue and speculation. Doctor Bordeu, who is called in to tend to the supposedly ill d'Alembert, helps Julie see that d'Alembert's ravings (and thus Diderot's materialist ideas) are not ravings at all, but intriguing and sense-making plausibilities. D'Alembert continues to mutter fevered snatches of his conversations with Diderot, from time to time waking up and witnessing the growing closeness between Julie and Bordeu with occasional unease. In the final dialogue, d'Alembert is absent: Julie has invited Bordeu to afternoon dinner, and they continue their conversation in a frankness unhampered by Julie's lover d'Alembert's presence. Julie leads the conversation with particular questions concerning speculative consequences of materialism, consequences related to sexuality, sexual deviancy, medical monstrosities, aliens, interspecies couplings,

and what we would now call possibilities of evolutionary change in species given a timeframe of thousands of millennia as well as nature's moral indifference.

My claim in this paper is that Diderot succeeds in giving his readers a philosophical dialogue that is also a literary work, with literature and philosophy giving each other "an increase in being" (in Hans-Georg Gadamer's phrase). The literariness of Diderot's dialogue is a form of mimesis, of that mirroring of contemporary life that Shaftesbury felt we moderns could no longer muster because a mirror too cruelly discloses the reprehensibility of our public lives. [Vanity makes us turn away from mirrors so that we remain willfully unaware of the sorry figures we make when we write about nothing but ourselves. It is only after a course of moral reform (soliloquizing in private, and only then, chastened, coming out in public) that modernity can be made fit for mirror writing again.] Shaftesbury wants us to turn ourselves into Ancients; Diderot pushes us to dare be Moderns. But if Diderot embraces the mirror as an instrument of self-realization, what is the concrete literary form of this mirror that he applies to his dialogue? Well, there is his joyful inclusion of the way eighteenth-century men and women of an intellectual class interacted with each other in intimate settings of bedroom and drawing room. But next to this culturally marked mimesis there is also a structural one, a literary form that French literature is particularly fond of and that Diderot uses very cannily: mise-en-abyme: the mirroring of something on one level in another level. In the case of this dialogue: what happens conceptually on the level of philosophy happens mimetically on that of literature.

One instance of how this works is Diderot-the-character's metaphor of the clavichord in the first dialogue. The clavichord is one of three governing metaphors in the dialogue for how the world's material organizes itself into forms of being—conscious and unconscious. The other two are the swarm of bees and the spider and its spiderweb; the clavichord is the one that sets d'Alembert thinking and dreaming, and together the three are partially

overlapping but non-exhaustive analogies of how a dynamic universe acts in constant change that knows neither first nor final things.

The clavichord is the metaphor the character Diderot comes up with when d'Alembert remarks that such things as memory and reasoning, thought and contemplation, consciousness and awareness cannot be accounted for by materialists. This because a creature's life in a (reactive) materialism "would only be an interrupted series of sensations without anything to bind them together" (102). So, what you need is both the sensations and the things that bind sensations together, things we call memory, awareness, consciousness, and personality. Diderot agrees, and suggests an active, not simply a reactive, materialism:

I have sometimes been led to compare the fibers that make up our sense organs with sensitive, vibrating strings. The string vibrates and makes a sound for a long time after it has been plucked. It is a vibration of this sort, it is this kind of necessary resonance, that keeps an object present to our minds while our understandings deal with whichever of its qualities we please to study. Besides, these vibrating strings have still another property—they can make other strings hum—so that in this way one idea can call forth another, the second can call forth a third, and so on.... [A] newly awakened idea can sometimes provoke a sympathetic response in a harmonic that is almost inconceivably remote. If this phenomenon can be observed in musical strings that are separate and inert, why should we not expect to find it wherever living points are connected with each other—why not in sensitive fibers that are continuous? (103)

D'Alembert objects that "You are trying to eliminate the distinction between mind and matter," and Diderot admits that indeed he is (104). D'Alembert has a next objection—that Diderot only introduces a new distinction that reframes the old distinction as that between

musician (mind-like) and vibrations (matter), with the musician deciding whether the vibrations are harmonic or dissonant. Diderot then insists on the difference between the clavichord—a musical instrument that needs to be played—and a human being—a bundle of continuous (rather than contiguous) sensitive fibers that are both instrument and player:

Our senses are merely keys that are struck by the natural world around us, keys that often strike themselves—and this, according to my way of thinking, is all that would take place in a clavichord organized as you and I are organized. There is an impression that has its cause either inside or outside the instrument; from this impression a sensation is born, a sensation that persists. . . . Then a second impression follows the first, arising similarly out of an external or internal cause; then there occurs a second sensation. And these sensations have tones—either natural or conventional sounds—that serve to identify them. (104).

Unlike the musical instrument that needs an outside cause for its strings to vibrate, "you and I" are plucked by both outside and inside causes. Going along with Diderot, d'Alembert infers that all that is needed in order to turn these clavichords "organized as you and I are" even more into "you and I," would be to endow them with the ability to eat and reproduce themselves. Next, Diderot has much to say about generation and germs of life, about inert substances bonding with other inert substances leading with the help of heat and motion to life of various kinds, the various kinds differing not in essence but only in "degree of organization" (106).

D'Alembert, somewhat brow-beaten, wants to go to sleep. Diderot predicts, "you are going to start dreaming about this conversation . . . and . . . you'll end up embracing some hypotheses far more ridiculous than anything I've suggested." D'Alembert vows that "I shall lie down a skeptic and get up in the morning still a skeptic" (110).

This wager the character Diderot is going to win: his philosophy is borne out by what happens to the literary characters that the writer Diderot makes of d'Alembert, Julie de l'Espinasse, and Bordeu.

[We do not know where the first dialogue took place: there is no introductory description, unlike in the case of most philosophical dialogues classical or modern: the conversation begins in medias res. That in itself is a literary mise-en-abyme of the philosophical conviction that this dialogue expounds, namely that there are no beginnings, only change from one state to another—can be from inert, inorganic to organic and alive, a difference that is really only a difference in density of organization in matter. But in the second dialogue we know exactly where we are: in a bedroom, with d'Alembert dreaming and feverish, spouting gibberish that Julie faithfully sets down on paper for the called Doctor Bordeu to use in his diagnosis of the ill man.]

In the clavichord metaphor the character Diderot explains that vibrating strings will set other strings vibrating, resulting in "a harmonic that is almost inconceivably remote." The second dialogue shows this happening. The first additional string is d'Alembert, fellow intellectual, whose dreams riff off on what he discussed, so skeptically, with Diderot. (His dream, incidentally, discloses that so much more had been talked about in the first dialogue than we readers got to read.) Diderot had refined his clavichord metaphor by presenting human beings not so much as sets of contiguous strings (as in the musical instrument), but as bundles of continuous fibers. In other words, human beings are much more densely organized clumps of matter, presenting a difference in degree rather than kind to other material objects. The most startling example of the definition of matter as a case of more or less dense organization in the first dialogue was that of bringing a marble statue (one by Falconet to boot!) to life: grind it up, mix it with humus, water it, give it a year or more, sow vegetables of that patch, and whoever eats the vegetables has turned lifeless marble into living flesh.

These notions resonate in d'Alembert's fever dreams, and that they resonate becomes clear when d'Alembert comes up with the metaphor of the swarm of bees. The metaphor extends and explains something he earlier did not understand, namely how the contiguous can shade into the continuous. The swarm of thousands of tiny creatures looks like a single, unique animal. Well, if they could, individual bees might dispute this to some extent but, as Doctor Bordeu (another resonating string) remarks, "All our organs are only distinct animals held together by the law of continuity in a general bond of sympathy, unity, or identity" (117).

Julie is astounded by how Bordeu and d'Alembert seem to consider sheer nonsense good sense. But Julie will graduate to full understanding of the materialist account of the nature of the world—but not after a preparatory experience with pure material bodiliness.

That experience begins with d'Alembert, dreaming, dejectedly mourning the poverty of materialism: "How wretched we are! How petty our ideas! There is nothing substantial except eating, drinking, living, making love and sleeping. . . . Mademoiselle de L'Epinasse, where are you?" (122). Julie comes closer, puts her hand under the bed clothes in an attempt to feel d'Alembert's pulse, cannot find his hand, witnesses "some sort of convulsion" in d'Alembert, a deep sigh, after which he falls "sound asleep." Julie "felt a peculiar kind of excitement that I could not account for," and her "heart began to pound violently, though not from fear." D'Alembert awakes with "a gentle smile playing on his lips," and he begins to talk of spawning fish, frustration, "stuff to be gathered up" and "sent to Needham." "Doctor," Julie asks, "how can you say he isn't out of his mind?" (122). Bordeu answers, "In your presence, what can I say?"

Julie pretends not to understand that she has witnessed, no provoked, a seminal emission in d'Alembert. She pretends that she could not account for "the peculiar kind of excitement" that she herself felt. She pretends to be surprised that d'Alembert's dejection has turned around after this episode of resonance between him and herself. Bordeu's answer. "In

your presence, what can I say?" pretty much is, so long as you are not one of the guys, what can I say?

Well, her curiosity, her interest in the discussion soon makes her one of the guys, or as close as an eighteenth-century female of her class can be imagined to be so by a cheerfully carnal writer such as Diderot. Julie proves it, first by setting loose her evolutionary imagination. Bordeu explains that want or desire sometimes guides evolutionary development so that a future race of intellectual men being "all head" would be possible. Julie counters with: "I look forward to the time when our unrestrained amorousness . . . what silly ideas you put into my mind!" She says enough to suggest a future race of people who are all sex organs to make even Bordeu blush: "Shhh!" (128), but he from now one feels free to discuss matters of sex with Julie. Julie throws off all false prudery and participates fully in Bordeu's and d'Alembert's sexual frankness and innuendo. D'Alembert at one point objects to Bordeu, "I think you are talking smut to Mademoiselle de L'Epinasse" (141).

And indeed, a clear resonance develops between Julie and Bordeu, a move from contiguity to continuity in which they occasionally finish each other's sentences, moving in tandem to a single view of the world, a materialist one along the lines Diderot set going in the first dialogue. D'Alembert, in his feverish key, keeps present and amplifies Diderot's initial vibration so that the continuity comprises three (or, counting Diderot, four) formerly contiguous vibrating strings. D'Alembert, though, is a diminishing presence in the second dialogue, and will disappear entirely in the third. Moving in and out of his fever sleep, d'Alembert is always more befuddled than Bordeu, and adds a comic touch to the dialogue, reminiscent of situations in Dante's *Inferno* with sinners (d'Alembert) piping up from sulfurous pits (d'Alembert's fever dreams) while Dante and Virgil (Julie and Bordeu) are too engaged in conversation on the ridges of the pit to heed the sinner too much, even though that sinner is a Florentine of Dante's own faction (active, nor merely reactive, materialism).

The swarm of bees is the metaphor for materialism's promise that contiguity can melt into continuity, divisibility into indivisibility. The clavichord is the tactile/aural image for materialism's ability to set sensibilities aquiver in harmony (or disharmony). The second dialogue begins with a sick man, a female love interest, and a doctor, but as they talk, they come to talk and think in concert, so to speak, and the sick man becomes a sane man, the doctor becomes an explicator and provider of pertinent medical anecdotes, and the love interest, Julie, becomes intellectually masculine and fit to participate. It is she who comes up with the third metaphor, the spider in its web, an improvement on the clavichord, with the threads of the web as the fibers of the body, connected in a central point (Bordeu identifies that as the meninges) represented by the spider. "Your idea is as sound as anything can be," Bordeu praises her (131) and "you not only grasp what is said to you; you go on to draw further conclusions that are astonishingly acute" (135). Bordeu at one point kisses Julie, with d'Alembert, not jealous, congratulating Bordeu on his "good judgment" (137).

So, here is the mise-en-abyme: the three characters, depicted in growing intellectual and physical closeness, make their verbal and physical interactions consonant with the conceptual thrust of Diderot's philosophy. The three ingest that philosophy and come to embody it, turning it from inert into living matter. Readers of this dialogue, of course, are invited to repeat this process of engastration and reverberation.

[Philosophy in engastration of literature?]


[A final word about the third dialogue, that very frank and intimate conversation between just Julie and Bordeu. At one point Bordeu feels compelled to say, "You see, after having behaved like a man, now you put on your boudoir cap and your petticoats again, and you're talking like a woman. All right for you! I'll have to treat you like a woman in that case" (179). As Bordeu leaves, Julie, flirtatiously, says: "remember occasionally that I am madly in love with you. If people only knew what horrible things you have been telling me

about!" (182). Julie's presence in the dialogues also makes clear that, whereas sex is a matter of biology, there is also the social phenomenon of gender, acculturated expressions of masculinity and femininity. Diderot makes Julie someone who comes to entirely understand sexuality, biology, and physics as materialist phenomena, in this way embodying the transition from "female" to "male" forms of intelligence. At the same time, she also displays "feminine" shock and outrage at what she understands. In this way, Julie performs her gender in a way that allows Diderot to suggest the culturally fixed artificiality of gender roles in opposition to the fluid naturalness of sexual difference.]

[In a knowing meta-generic aside Diderot has one of his characters, Julie de l'Espinasse, say after a long passage of stimulating conversational pell-mell, "What is the harm in that? We are only having a conversation, not writing a treatise on the subject" (156-57).]

Barzun translation, note p. 112.

For instance, about the "special kind of sensation we receive through out feet, hands etc." Bordeu refers to the sexual sensation. Julie answers, "That sensation is the only one of its kind, more's the pity" (136)





Conference Programme 1st Day (All times are listed according to Central European Time) Beginning: 14:00-14:15 Genres, figures of thinking

14:15-14:35 Jonathan Lavery (Wilfrid Laurier University, Canada),

Dating, Situation, and Reading Plato's 'Apology'

14:35-14:55 Rudolphus Teeuwen (National Sun Yat-sen University, Taiwan), Emerging from Dialogue: Julie de l'Espinasse in Diderot's D'Alembert's Dream

14:55-15:15 Jakub Marek (Charles University in Prague, Czech Republic),

The Novel and the Socratic Heritage of the Examined Soul

15:15-15:35 Yi-Ping Ong (Johns Hopkins University, United States of America),

A History of Philosophy from the Point of View of the Novel: Nineteenth and Twentieth Century Developments

15:35-15:55 Andrzej Zawadzki (Jagiellonian University, Poland),

Don Quixote among philosophers. Establishing directness


15:55-16:15 Discussion







Transdisciplinary categories 16:05-16:25 Michał Paweł Markowski (University of Illinois at Chicago, United States of America), Fanaticism: Between Religion, Literature, and Philosophy 16:25-16:45 Marcin Czardybon (University of Warsaw, Poland), "Under the guise of the concept of the sublime". On thymos, political philosophy, and literature 16:45-17:05 Tinni Goswami (St. Xavier's College, Kolkata, Republic of India), On the discourse of nationalism: models of critical retrospection of divergent judgements, Tagore and Gandhi 17:05-17:25 Michał Kozłowski (University of Warsaw, Poland), How to make a concept out of a story – notes on Gandhi's "The ideal Bhangi" 17:25-17:45 Victoria Malkina (Russian State University for Humanities, Moscow, Russia), Historical Memory in Philosophy and Literature of the XX–XXI Centuries 17:45-18:05 Discussion



109年度專題研究計畫成果彙整表

計畫主持人: 田偉文			計畫編號:109-2629-H-110-002-		
計畫名稱:狄德羅的《達朗柏的夢》:唯物主義、生物學、性別					
成果項目			量化	單位	質化 (說明:各成果項目請附佐證資料或細 項說明,如期刊名稱、年份、卷期、起 訖頁數、證號等)
國內	學術性論文	期刊論文	0	篇	
		研討會論文	0		
		專書	0	本	
		專書論文	0	章	
		技術報告	0	篇	
		其他	0	篇	
		期刊論文	0		
國外	學術性論文	研討會論文	1	篇	"Emerging from Dialogue: Julie de l' Espinasse in Diderot's D' Alembert's Dream" 發表於 Warsaw University的Polish Studies所屬的 Research Centre for Contextual Studies and Literary Tradition Studies與 Charles University in Prague的Philosophy系所九月四日至九月五日合辦的 "Literature and Philosophy. Research Methods. Figures of Form and Thought. An International Scholarly Conference",因疫情為Zoom網路演討會,發表論文附件報告裡。
		專書	0	本	
		專書論文	0	章	
		技術報告	0	篇	
		其他	0	篇	
參與計畫人力	本國籍	大專生	0	人次	
		碩士生	0		
		博士生	1		為雙國籍學生,另國籍為美國。
		博士級研究人員	0		
		專任人員	0		
	非本國籍	大專生	0		
		碩士生	0		
		博士生	0		
		博士級研究人員	0		
		專任人員	0		

其他成果

(無法以量化表達之成果如辦理學術活動、獲得獎項、重要國際合作、研究成果國際影響力及其他協助產業技術發展之具體效益事項等,請以文字敘述填列。)